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ABSTRACT
The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule for z candidates such that in each
vote, the first candidate receives z−1 points, the second z−2 points and so on. The
winner in the Borda rule is the candidate with highest total score. We study the ma-
nipulation problem of the Borda rule in a setting with two non-manipulators while
one of the non-manipulator’s vote is weighted. We demonstrate a sharp contrast
on computational complexity depending on the weight of the non-manipulator: the
problem is NP-hard when the weight is larger than 1 while there exists an efficient
algorithm to find a manipulation when the weight is at most 1.
1 Introduction
Voting is a general mechanism to aggregate preferences in multi-agent systems to select a socially
desirable candidate. However, Gibbrard-Sattertwhaite theorem states that all (nondictatorial) vot-
ing protocols are manipulable Gibbard [1973], Satterthwaite [1975]. Therefore, a key problem
confronted by the voting mechanisms is manipulation by the voters, i.e., a voter submits a vote dif-
ferent from her true preference such that the outcome becomes more favorable for her. Since voting
mechanisms are tailored to generate a socially desirable outcome, insincere preference report may
result in an undesirable candidate to be chosen.
Although the existence of manipulation is guaranteed, the computational hardness could be the
barrier for a manipulation. This paper focuses on a specific scoring rule: Borda rule. In a voting
under Borda with z candidates, each agent gives a list of candidates according to their preference,
the candidate appearing in the k-th place receives a score of z − k. The candidate with the highest
total score wins the election. We refer readers to Dasgupta and Maskin [2008] for a comprehensive
survey and introduction on Borda voting and social choice in general.
Under coalitional condition, Conitzer et al. [2007] proved that the Borda manipulation is NP-
hard when votes are weighted. Reducing from the RN3DM problem Yu et al. [2004], Davies
et al. [2011] proved that unweighted Borda manipulation is NP-hard for a group of 2 insincere
voters (manipulators). Furthermore, Betzler et al. [2011] proved that the problem remains NP-hard
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when there are more than 2 honest voters (non-manipulators). It still remains open whether the
manipulation is hard when there are only 2 non-manipulators.
In this paper, we consider a setting with 2 manipulators and 2 non-manipulators. However, manip-
ulation is in fact easy to find in this setting if all the votes are unweighted. Henceforth, we turn
our attention to an environment in which one of the non-manipulator’s vote is weighted by a pa-
rameter w ∈ Q>0, while the votes from other votes are unweighted, i.e., weighted by 1. Weighted
voting rules have been applied to many real world applications, such as collaborative filtering in
recommender systems Pennock et al. [2000], and recently have been playing an important role
for policy design in blockchains. For example, in the DPOS (delegated proof of stake) Larimer
[2014], weighted voting rule is applied for agents to elect the witnesses who are responsible for
validating transactions and creating blocks, and each agent’s vote is weighted by how much stakes
(i.e., coins/tokens) she owns.
Our main contribution is to demonstrate a complexity boundary at w = 1: for w ≤ 1, we design
an efficient algorithm for the manipulators to find a manipulation, while for fixed w > 1, we show
that it is NP-hard to find a manipulation. When w > 1 and w ∈ Z, we can cast our results to the
unweighted setting by consideringw+1 non-manipulators whose votes are unweighted and among
them, w non-manipulators share the same vote. Therefore, we are able to recover the hardness
results in unweighted settings from Betzler et al. [2011] for more than 2 non-manipulators. Based
on our results, we conjecture that in a weighted Borda setting with multiple manipulators and non-
manipulators, it is computationally hard for the group of manipulators to find a manipulation if and
only if the total weights on the votes from manipulators are strictly less than the total weights on
non-manipulators’ votes. Our result is served to be the first step to understand the conjecture.
Related Work When there is one manipulator, Bartholdi et al. [1989] proved that most promi-
nent voting rules could be efficiently manipulated by Greedy manipulation. After that, there is
a growing body of research on voting manipulation in the last two decades Hemaspaandra and
Hemaspaandra [2007], Conitzer and Sandholm [2002], Conitzer et al. [2003], Russell [2007], Xia
and Conitzer [2008], Xia et al. [2009, 2010], Davies et al. [2010], Lu et al. [2012].
Motivated by the results that the coalitional manipulation of the Borda rule Conitzer et al. [2007],
Davies et al. [2011] is hard in many cases, the algorithms to calculate the manipulation for Borda
rule have been proposed along the history. Zuckerman et al. [2009] design an efficient algorithm
for coalitional weighted manipulation, which gives a successful manipulation when given an extra
manipulator with maximal weight and returns false when the manipulation is impossible. Davies
et al. [2010] provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form of two
new greedy manipulation algorithms based on intuitions from the bin-packing and multiprocessor
scheduling domains, which indicate that though Borda may be hard to manipulate computation-
ally, it provides very little defense against the coalitional manipulation. Instead of searching for
an exact manipulation, practical approximation algorithms have been proposed Brelsford et al.
[2008], Davies et al. [2011], Keller et al. [2017]. Recently, Yang [2015] prove that the unweighted
Borda manipulation problem with two manipulators is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to
single-peaked width and Yang and Guo [2016] design the exact algorithms for both weighted and
unweighted Borda manipulation.
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2 Preliminaries
In an election, there is a set of candidates C and a set of voters V . For each voter, his vote is a
total order of all the candidates in C. A voting protocol is a function mapping all the votes to a
candidate c ∈ C, who is the winner of the election. Suppose there are |C| = z candidates in total
and Borda is a voting protocol in which for each vote, a candidate receives z − 1 points if it ranks
first, z − 2 points if it ranks second, · · · , 0 if it ranks last. After adding up all the scores (number
of points) in the votes, the candidate with the highest total score wins the election. If there is a tie,
the protocol randomly chooses one candidate from all the candidates with the highest scores, with
equal probability.
In a manipulation of the voting rule, some of the voters, called the manipulators, learn the other
voters’ votes before they submit their own votes so that they can try to find a way to manipulate
their votes to alter the outcome. We assume that the objective of the manipulators is to elect a
specific candidate c∗ ∈ C. A manipulation is successful if the manipulators’ votes result in c∗’s
winning probability larger than 0, i.e., no other candidate has a higher total score than c∗.
In this paper, we focus on a setting with two manipulators and two non-manipulators. For conve-
nience, we denote C = {c1, c2, · · · , cz−1, c∗} and V = {N1, N2,M1,M2}, where N1, N2 are the
non-manipulators and M1,M2 are the manipulators. Moreover, we assume the vote from the non-
manipulators N1 is weighted by w while the vote from all other voters are weighted by 1. In other
words, each point N1 gives in the Borda rule is multiplied by w such that the first-rank candidate
receives w(z−1), the second-rank candidate receives w(z−2), and so on so forth. Throughout the
paper, when we present the vote from N1, the scores have already taken the multiplication factor
w into account. We denote the manipulation problem under this setting as 2-2BM.
To represent the votes, for the non-manipulator Nj(1 ≤ j ≤ 2), let vji be the score that she gives
to candidate ci(1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1) and vj∗ be the score to candidate c∗. Similarly, for manipulators
Mj(1 ≤ j ≤ 2), let tji be the score that she gives to candidate ci(1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1) and tj∗
be the score to candidate c∗. Let V Nj (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) be the set of scores given to all candidates
by Nj and VMj (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) be the set of scores given to all candidates by Mj . Therefore, we
have V N1 = {v11, v12, · · · , v1(z−1), v1∗} = {0, w, 2w, · · · , (z − 1)w} and V N2 = VM1 = VM2 =
{0, 1, 2, · · · , z − 1}.
3 Efficient Manipulation for w ≤ 1
We start with the cases when w ≤ 1, in which we design an efficient algorithm to find a manipula-
tion.
Definition 1 (Respective REVERSE algorithm). Manipulator Mj’s vote is constructed by revers-
ing Nj’s vote and then promoting candidate c∗ to the first place.
Theorem 1. Respective REVERSE algorithm can always make c∗ to be one of the winners when
w ≤ 1.
Proof. Let rj(c) be candidate c’s rank in Nj’s vote. After the reversion process of the algorithm,
for any candidate c, her total score is (1+w) ·z+(1−w) ·r1(c)−2 ≤ 2z−2, where the maximum
is taken when r1(c) = z. Moreover, after the promotion of candidate c∗, the total score of c∗ is
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(3+w)·z−w ·r1(c∗)−r2(c∗)−2 ≥ 2z−2 where the minimum is taken when r1(c∗) = r2(c∗) = z.
Moreover, notice that the promotion of c∗ does not increase the total score of any candidate other
than c∗. Therefore, the final score of c∗ is at least of the total score of any other candidate, and
thus, c∗ is one of the winners after the manipulation.
4 Hardness Results with w ≥ 3
We now turn to the situation where one non-manipulator’s vote is weighted by w ≥ 3. Our
reduction is based on the 2-numerical matching with target sums (2NMTS) problem.
Definition 2. In a 2-numerical matching with target sums (2NM-TS) problem, given m integers
2 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ am ≤ 2m with
∑m
i=1 ai = m(m + 1), the objective is to determine whether
there exist two 1-to-m permutations p1 and p2 such that ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, p1(j) + p2(j) = aj .
Lemma 1. 2NMTS is NP-hard.
Proof. We show that 2NMTS is a variant of RN3DM (restricted numerical 3-dimensional match-
ing): given a multi-set U = {u1, · · · , um} of integers and an integer e such that
∑m
i=1 ui +
m · (m + 1) = m · e, decide whether there exist two 1-to-m permutations σ and pi such that
σ(i) + pi(i) + ui = e for all i, which is proved to be NP-hard Yu et al. [2004]. Since variable e is
fixed, let aj = e − uj and therefore, the RN3DM problem is equivalent to the 2NMTS problem.
Thus, 2NMTS is NP-hard.
Theorem 2. 2-2BM is NP-hard when one of the non-manipulators is weighted by w ≥ 3 and
w ∈ Q.
Let the total number of candidates be z = d(w+2)me+1 and we construct the non-manipulators’
votes as follows: v1∗ = wd(w − 1)me + w and v2∗ = d(w − 2)me + a1 − 2. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
we set v1i = w(z − i) and v2i = bdi − v1ic, where di = v1∗ + v2∗ + 2z − am+1−i.
For the rest of the candidates, we arrange the remaining scores from N2 in an increasing order g1,
g2, · · · , gd(w+1)me. Similarly, we arrange the remaining scores from N1 in decreasing order u1, u2,
· · · , ud(w+1)me. For m + 1 ≤ i ≤ d(w + 2)me, we set v1i = ui−m and v2i = gi−m. We finish the
proof of Theorem 2 by showing that the answer to the 2-2BM instance is “Yes" if and only if the
answer to the corresponding 2NMTS instance is “Yes".
Lemma 2. The answer to the 2-2BM instance is “Yes" only if the answer to the corresponding
2NMTS instance is “Yes".
Proof. By our construction of v1i and v2i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have v1i + v2i + am+1−i − 2 ≤
v1∗ + v2∗ + 2z − 2 and v1i + v2i + am+1−i − 1 > v1∗ + v2∗ + 2z − 2. Moreover, since candidate
c∗ gets v1∗ + v2∗ points from N1 and N2 and the two manipulators can give him at most 2(z − 1)
points, in order to ensure c∗ wins with probability larger than 0, we need to have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
t1i + t2i = am+1−i − 2, which implies that the answer to the instance of the 2NMTS is “Yes".
Lemma 3. The answer to the 2-2BM instance is “Yes" if the answer to the corresponding 2NMTS
instance is “Yes".
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Proof. If the answer to the 2NMTS problem is “Yes", the two manipulators have a way to give the
scores from {0, · · · ,m− 1} to the first m candidates such that the total score of any of them is at
most
F ∗ = 2(z − 1) + v1∗ + v2∗
= wd(w − 1) ·me+ d(w − 2)me+ w + a1 + 2z − 4
≥ (w2 + 2w + 2) ·m+ w + a1 − 2.
For the remaining scores from manipulators, we simply allocate them such that for m + 1 ≤ i ≤
d(w + 2)me, t1i = t2i = i− 1. As for the non-manipulator N1, for any m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ (w + 2) ·m,
we set v′1i = w · (z − i).
Recall our construction for v1i and v2i m + 1 ≤ i ≤ d(w + 2)me, we have v1i ≤ w(z − i) ≡ v′1i
and v2i ≤ i− 1 ≡ v′2i. We argue that for any m + 1 ≤ i ≤ d(w + 2)me, her total score is at most
F ∗ even if her scores are v′1i and v
′
2i.
Since all elements in {v′1i}, {v′2i}, {t1i} and {t2i} forms arithmetic sequences, the total scores {Fi}
should also be an arithmetic sequence for m + 1 ≤ i ≤ d(w + 2)me. Therefore, it is sufficient to
check the total scores of the cm+1 and cd(w+2)me. For cm+1, her total score Fm+1 is
Fm+1 = wd(w + 1)me+ 3m ≤ (w2 + w + 3) ·m+ w
≤ (w2 + 2w + 2) ·m+ w + a1 − 2
where the first inequalty is due to wd(w + 1)me ≤ w(w + 1)m + w and the second inequality is
due to w ≥ 3 and a1 ≥ 2. As for cd(w+2)me, her total score Fd(w+2)me is
Fd(w+2)me = w + 3d(w + 2)me − 3 < (3w + 6)m+ w
≤ (w2 + 2w + 2)m+ w + a1 − 2
where the first inequality is due to 3d(w + 2)me ≤ 3(w + 2)m + 3 and the second one is due to
w ≥ 3 and a1 ≥ 2.
Therefore, we finish the reduction from 2NMTS to 2-2BM and show that 2-2BM is NP-hard when
one of the non-manipulators is weighted by w ≥ 3.
5 Case with 1 < w < 3
We now turn to the region with 1 < w < 3. Recall that our construction for w ≥ 3 relies on the
condition that inequality 3w + 6 ≤ w2 + 2w + 2 holds to upper bound Fd(w+2)me. Therefore, it
requires us to make a new construction to demonstrate that the manipulation is still computational
hard for 1 < w < 3.
5.1 Integral Weights
We start with the easier case when the weight w is integral, i.e., w = 2, and we will prove the
hardness for the case when w is a real number in Section 5.2.
Theorem 3. 2-2BM is NP-hard when one of the non-manipulators is weighted by w = 2.
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Group ID 1 2 3
N1(2×) 6m→ 5m+ 1 5m→ 4m+ 1 4m→ 3m+ 1
N2 5m→ 4m+ 1 4m→ 3m+ 1 3m→ 2m+ 1
M1 m→ 2m− 1 2m→ 3m− 1 4m→ 5m− 1
M2 m→ 2m− 1 3m→ 4m− 1 4m→ 5m− 1
Group ID 4 5 6
N1(2×) 3m→ 2m+ 1 2m− 1→ m m− 1→ 0
N2 2m→ m+ 1 5m+ 1→ 6m 6m+ 1→ 7m
M1 5m→ 6m− 1 7m− 1→ 6m 4m− 1→ 3m
M2 6m→ 7m− 1 2m→ 3m− 1 5m→ 6m− 1
Table 1: Construction of Votings on other 6m Candidates.
Given an instance of 2NMTS with a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ am, we construct an instance of 2-2BM as
follows. We set the number of all the candidates be z = 7m+1 and the votes of non-manipulators
are constructed as follows:
• v1∗ = 4m and v2∗ = m+ a1;
• For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, v1i = 2(z − i) and v2i = z + 2i− am+1−i − 2m+ a1 − 1.
Note that N2’s vote does not contain two duplicate score since m+ a1 ≤ 3m < z+2i− am+1−i−
2m+a1−1 ≤ 7m+2i−2m ≤ 7m and z+2i−am+1−i−2m+a1−1 is monotonically increasing
as i increases. Moreover, let Pi = 3z − am+1−i − 2m + a1 − 1 = v1i + v2i and we note that the
current total score of candidate c∗ is 5m+ a1.
Now we have allocated m+1 different scores for N1 and N2. To construct the remaining votes, we
divide the remaining 6m candidates into 6 groups. Group k contains the candidates ckm+1, ckm+2,
· · · , c(k+1)m for 1 ≤ k ≤ 6. Since the remaining scores of N2 are not consecutive, we consider the
situation when the remaining scores of N2 are the highest 6m scores, i.e., the scores are between
m + 1 and 7m. We call these scores virtual scores. Now we give the method to allocate the
remaining scores from the virtual scores. The detailed construction is presented in Table 1.
For a group containing candidates from ca, · · · , cb, ` → r with ` < r in the table indicates that
this voter gives candidate ca+j (` + j) points for all 0 ≤ j ≤ b− a. If ` > r, then this voter gives
candidate ca+j (` − j) points for all 0 ≤ j ≤ b − a. Note that the numbers shown in Table 1 are
the unweighted scores, and therefore, “(2×)" means that the scores given by N1 will be doubled
since her vote is weighted by w = 2. The only undetermined part is how M1 and M2 allocates
their scores from {0, · · · ,m − 1} to the candidates in {c1, · · · , cm, c∗}. We prove Theorem 3 by
showing that the answer to the constructed instance of 2-2BM is “Yes” if and only if the answer to
the corresponding instance of 2NMTS is “Yes”.
Lemma 4. The answer to the constructed instance of 2-2BM is “Yes” only if the answer to the
corresponding instance of 2NMTS is “Yes”
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Proof. First of all, we have
m∑
i=1
Pi =
m∑
i=1
(3z − am+1−i − 2m+ a1 − 1)
= 3zm−m(m+ 1)− 2m2 + a1m−m
= m · (3z + a1 − 2− 3m).
Moreover, let Fi be the sum of the final score of candidate ci(1 ≤ i ≤ m). Since the two manipu-
lators at least give these m candidates m(m− 1) points, we obtain
m∑
i=1
Fi ≥ m · (3z + a1 − 2− 3m) +m(m− 1)
= m · (3z + a1 − 3− 2m).
In addition, notice that two manipulators can give c∗ at most 2(z − 1) points by both ranking him
first in the vote. Therefore, the final total score F ∗ of c∗ must satisfy
F ∗ ≤ 5m+ a1 + 2(z − 1)
= z − 2m− 1 + a1 + 2(z − 1)
= 3z + a1 − 3− 2m.
Thus, the average score of the candidates c1, c2, · · · , cm is at least 3z+a1−3−2m, which is equal
to the highest score c∗ may get. In order to let c∗ win with non-zero probability, all ci(1 ≤ i ≤ m)
and c∗ must have the same final score 3z+a1−3−2m. To make ci have final score 3z+a1−3−2m,
the manipulators must have t1i + t2i = 3z + a1 − 3 − 2m − Pi = am+1−i − 2. Recall that the
equality of
∑m
i=1 Fi = m · (3z + a1 − 3− 2m) is obtained when the two manipulators give these
m candidates m(m− 1) points, and thus, {t11 + 1, · · · , t1m + 1} and {t21 + 1, · · · , t2m + 1} must
be a permutation of {1, · · · ,m}, which constitutes an instance of 2NMTS problem. Therefore,
candidate c∗ has a non-zero probability to win the election only if the answer to the instance of
2NMTS is “Yes”.
Lemma 5. The answer to the constructed instance of 2-2BM is “Yes” if the answer to the corre-
sponding instance of 2NMTS is “Yes”.
Proof. When the corresponding instance of 2NMTS is “Yes”, there is a way to construct
{t11, · · · , t1m} and {t21, · · · , t2m} such that t1i + t2i + Pi = F ∗ = 19m + a1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Since a1 ≥ 2, it suffices to make sure that Fi ≤ 19m+ 2 for all m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 7m.
Recall the construction presented in Table 1 and notice that in each group, the scores constitute an
arithmetic sequence. We can conclude that the highest scores from group 1 to group 6 are 19m,
19m, 19m, 19m, 18m−1, 17m−1, respectively. Therefore all candidates from cm+1 to c7m would
not get a higher total score than 19m + 2. Thus, c∗ would win with non-zero probability against
the virtual scores.
To construct the vote for N2 without duplicated scores, let V = [z] \ {v2∗, v2i, · · · , v2m}. For a
candidate c that is given p in the virtual scores, N2 gives candidate c the (7m − p + 1)-th highest
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score from V . By this construction, it is clear that the scores candidate c gets in the vote is no more
than what he can get under virtual scores, which concludes our proof for the if direction.
Combining Lemma 4 and 5, we finish the reduction and demonstrate that 2-2BM is NP-hard when
w = 2.
5.2 Rational Weights
We generalize our complexity results to the cases where w is a rational number.
Theorem 4. 2-2BM is NP-hard when one of the non-manipulators is weighted by 1 < w < 3.
Suppose that w = 1 +  with 0 <  < 2. We prove the theorem by a reduction from a restricted
form of 2NMTS:
Lemma 6. Suppose that there are m > max{3, 3

} and m ∈ Z given integers 0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤
· · · ≤ am ≤ 2(m − 1), where
∑m
i=1 si = m(m − 1). Whether there exist two 0-to-(m − 1)
permutations p1 and p2, s.t ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, p1(j) + p2(j) = aj is an NP-hard problem.
Proof. This is a restricted form of 2NMTS. Suppose there is a polynomial algorithm which is
able to solve every instance in the restricted 2NMTS problem, we can enumerate all the finite
instances of 2NMTS whenm > max{3, 3

} and run the algorithm for restricted 2NMTS whenm >
max{3, 3

}. Henceforth, by adding 1 to each term of the two permutations, we get a polynomial
algorithm for 2NMTS. Therefore we complete the reduction from restricted 2NMTS to 2NMTS,
and thus, the restricted form of 2NMTS is NP-hard.
Given an instance a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ am of restricted 2NMTS, we construct a corresponding
instance of the 2-2BM. When m > 3

, we set z = D +m + 1, where D = b(2 + )mc · p + 3m
and p is a sufficiently large integer.
Construction for {c1, · · · , cm, c∗} For candidate c∗ and c1, the votes from N1 and N2 are:
v1∗ = (1 + )
⌊
(1 + )(D + 1) + a1 −D −m
1 + 
⌋
,
v2∗ = d(1 + )(D + 1) + a1 −D −m− v1∗e ,
v11 = (1 + )(D + 1) and v21 = D +m.
First, notice that v11+v21 = (1+ )(D+1)+D+m, v11+v21+a1+1 > 2(D+m)+v1∗+v2∗ ≥
v11 + v21 + a1, where only the candidate with the highest rank in a manipulator’s vote can receive
(D + m) points. Therefore, to ensure that c∗ wins with non-zero probability, they must give
candidate c1 at most a1 points in total. Let F ∗ = v1∗+v2∗+2(D+m), which is the largest possible
final score of c∗. We construct the scores given to ci(2 ≤ i ≤ m) from the non-manipulators:
v1i = (1 + )(D + i) and v2i = bF ∗ − v1i − aic.
We first argue that there is no duplicate score in our construction so far. For N1, the scores he gives
to candidates ci with 1 ≤ i ≤ m are monotonically increasing. Moreover, the scores he gives c∗ is
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Figure 1: Vote constructions for the {c1, · · · , cm, c∗} are shown as red vertical bars
v1∗ ≤ (1+ )(D+1)+a1−D−m+1+  < (1+ )(D+1) = v11. As for N2, notice that both v1i
and ai are increasing as i increases. In addition, when i increases by 1, v1i increases by (1+) > 1,
and thus, v2i decreases by at least 1. Therefore, v2i is strictly decreasing as i increases. Finally,
with sufficiently large p, the difference between v1∗ and v11 is at least D +m − a1 − 1 −  > 1.
Therefore, there is no duplicate score in N2, either.
Construction for (2p+3)m candidates in groups Since the used scores for both N1 and N2 are
not consecutive, we again consider virtual scores to facilitate our analysis. Since N1 has arranged
all of her highest m scores, in the context of virtual scores, the highest remaining D scores are
{(1 + ), (1 + ) · 2, · · · , (1 + )D}. For N2, since N2 has used the highest score (D + m), the
possible highest D scores in the context of virtual scores are {m,m+ 1, · · · , D +m− 1}.
Now we construct the votes based on the virtual remaining scores as shown in Figure 2. We will
fully construct the votes from N1 and N2 and use all the scores except {0, 1, · · · ,m− 1, D +m}
to construct votes from M1 and M2.
We divide the further construction into 2 steps. In the first step we select (2p + 3) groups of
candidates. Each group contains m candidates receiving consecutive scores from each voter. Each
group is denoted in Figure 2 as a line segment with its group number over it. The arrows in the
figure show the inner rank within each group. i.e. supposing group 4 contains ca to ca+m−1, then
we have v1i = (D−i+a−m)(1+), v2i = t1i = 4m+i−a, t2i = D+a1−6m+b(m+1)c−i+a,
∀i ∈ Z, a ≤ i ≤ a+m− 1.
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Figure 2: Vote construction for the remaining D candidates. From the top to the bottom are N1, N2, M1 and
M2’s votes respectively. Each segment contains m scores and the labels below some of the segments show
the highest score in some of the groups.
For N1, we select the scores for the groups as shown in the figure. Group 2 and group 3 receive
the last 2m scores. From group 4, the arrangement of the group is consecutive right after group 1.
The red bars denote the other candidates’ scores, after removing these groups of candidates.
For N2 and M1, the first four groups occupy the lowest 4m scores left for the two voters. Starting
from group 5, each time we generate the scores of a group, we select m scores such that (1) they
are respectively m points higher than the last group of the same voter; (2) they are respectively
b(1+ )mc points higher than the last group of the other voter. More precisely, for N2 and M1, we
alternate in (1) and (2) between N2 and M1 to generate the scores. For example, in N2’s voting,
each member in group 5 is m points larger than the member in group 4 respectively and each
member in group 6 is b(1 + )mc points larger than a member in group 5, while in M1’s voting,
each member in group 5 is b(1 + )mc points larger than the member in group 4 respectively and
each member in group 6 is m points larger than the member in group 5. Therefore, all candidates
except the candidates in group 1, 2, 3 can be partitioned into larger groups such that each group
has b(2+ )mc candidates. Since D = b(2+ )mc · p+3m, there are p larger groups. We can also
derive that the biggest score in the group 2p + 3 of M1 is D +m − 1, which is the biggest score
left for him.
For M2, the first three groups occupy the highest 3m scores. There is a gap between group 1 and
4, which is from D+ a1− 6m+ b(m+1)c+1 to D− 2m− 1. Moreover, such a gap exists since
we have b(m+ 1)c+ a1 + 2 ≤ 4m due to a1 ≤ m− 1, m ≥ 3, and  ≤ 2.
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Starting from group 5, each member in the newly generated group is m+1 points lower than each
member in the previous group respectively. By our construction, the lowest score in group 2p + 3
is sl, which is at most
D + a1 − 6m+ 2 + b(m+ 1)c − 2p(m+ 1)
≥ D + a1 − 7m+ (m+ 1)− 1− (m+ 1)(2p− 1) + 1
= b(2 + )mc · p+ a1 − 4m+ (m+ 1)(− 2p+ 1)
= (b(2 + )mc − 2m− 2)p+ a1 − 4m+ (m+ 1)(1 + ).
Since m > 3

, with sufficiently large p, we have sl ≥ m.
Construction for the remaining candidates All that remains to construct is to arrange the scores
for the candidates who are not in the 2p + 3 groups (represented as red bars in Figure 2). There
are R = D − (2p + 3)m = b(2 + )mc · p − 2pm scores and candidates left. We denote these
R candidates by cr1 , cr2 , · · · , crR . In both N1 and N2’s votes, we sort the remaining scores from
high to low and give cri the i-th highest remaining score. In both M1 and M2’s votes, we sort the
remaining scores from low to high and give cri the i-th lowest score. We finish our reduction by
showing that the answer to the constructed instance of 2-2BM is “Yes” if and only if the answer to
the corresponding instance of restricted form of 2NMTS is “Yes”.
Lemma 7. The answer to the constructed instance of 2-2BM is “Yes” only if the answer to the
corresponding instance of restricted form of 2NMTS is “Yes”.
Proof. Since F ∗−v1i−ai−1 < v2i, if two manipulators give the candidate ci more than ai points in
total, the total score of candidate ci will be at least v1i+v2i+ai+1 > F ∗−v1i−ai−1+ai+1+v1i =
F ∗. Therefore, manipulators can give ci at most ai points.
Consider the scores given by the manipulators to candidates {c1, · · · , cm}. Notice that the lowest
m scores from both manipulators sum up to 2
∑m−1
i=0 i = (m− 1) ·m =
∑m
i=1 ai. Henceforth, the
sum of their scores given to ci with should be exactly ai for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Therefore, to ensure c∗
can win with non-zero probability, the answer to the corresponding instance of restricted 2NMTS
must be “Yes”.
Lemma 8. The answer to the constructed instance of 2-2BM is “Yes” if the answer to the corre-
sponding instance of restricted form of 2NMTS is “Yes”.
When both manipulators rank c∗ in their first place, the total score of c∗ is F ∗ ≥ (1 + )(D +
1) + D + m + a1. Moreover, when the answer to the corresponding instance of restricted form
of 2NMTS is “Yes”, by using scores from {0, · · · ,m − 1} only, the manipulators can ensure the
total score of candidate ci with 1 ≤ i ≤ m is at most F ∗. The remaining proof of Lemma 8 is
separated into Lemma 9 and 10. These two lemmas together demonstrates that for any ci with
m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ D +m, her total score is at most F ∗.
Lemma 9. There is no candidate in the 2p+ 3 groups whose total score is more than F ∗.
Proof. Since within each group the scores of the candidates are consecutive, forming an arithmetic
sequence, the highest score in each group should appear in either the leftmost place or the rightmost
place. Notice that inN1 andM2 the candidates are arranged from higher score to lower score and in
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N2 and M1 the candidates are arranged from lower score to higher score. In addition, the common
difference of scores in each group of N1’s vote is 1 + , larger than the difference in others’ votes.
Therefore, the candidate with the highest total score in each group is the leftmost candidate in the
group appearing in N1. Let hi with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2p+ 3 be the highest total score among candidates in
group i.
First we prove that the total score of candidates in group 1 is at most F ∗: since h1 = (1 + )D +
m +m +D − 2m = (2 + )D < (1 + )(D + 1) +D +m + a1 ≤ F ∗, no candidate in group 1
has a total score higher than c∗.
For group 2 and group 3, notice that the candidate in group 2 have higher scores than the candidates
in group 3, and therefore, we only need to consider h2. We have h2 = (1 + )(2m) + 2m+ 3m+
D− 1 = (7+ 2)m+D− 1 ≤ (1 + )(D+1)+D+ a1 +m ≤ F ∗, where the second-to-the-last
inequality is true by selecting a sufficiently large p. For group 4, since h4 = (1+)(D−m)+4m+
4m+D+a1−6m−1+b(m+1)c ≤ D(2+)+m+a1−1+ < (1+)(D+1)+D+a1+m ≤ F ∗.
For group i with i ≥ 5, first we notice that
hi = hi−1 − (1 + )m+ b(1 + )mc − (m+ 1) +m
= hi−1 − (1 + )m+ b(1 + )mc − 1
< hi−1.
Therefore, hi ≤ h4 ≤ F ∗ for all i ≥ 5.
Lemma 10. There is no candidate among remaining R candidates outside the groups having a
total score more than F ∗.
Proof. We calculate the highest possible score of these R candidates. Suppose that N2 and M1
give candidate cri score xi and yi respectively. Notice that all the remaining scores in N2 and M1
are gathered in groups, each groups has exactly bmc candidates and the distance between two
adjacent groups is exactly 2m. Since xi is the ith highest score left for N2 and yi is the ith lowest
score left for M1, xi + yi is a constant, which is D +m− 1 + 5m = D + 6m− 1.
Notice that the remaining R scores from N1 are consecutive from 2m + 1 to 2m + R. Since
M2’s remaining scores are not consecutive, we consider a set of virtual scores such that we assume
M2’s remaining R scores are from D − 2m − R to D − 2m − 1. By sorting these R scores from
low to high and giving cri the i
th lowest scores, the total score of cri will not be larger than the
total score in the actual vote. In the virtual scores, the scores from N1 and M2 form arithmetic
sequences, and therefore, the highest-score candidate is the candidate who gets the highest score
in N1’s votes. Her total score is (1 + )(2m+ R) + (D + 6m− 1) + (D − 2m− R). Recall that
R = D − (2p+ 3)m = b(2 + )mc · p− 2pm. Therefore, we have
(1 + )(2m+R) + (D + 6m− 1) + (D − 2m−R)
= (1 + )(D − (2p+ 1)m) + (D + 6m− 1) + (2p+ 1)m
≤ (1 + )(D + 1) + a1 +D +m
≤ F ∗.
where the second-to-the-last inequality holds with a sufficiently large p.
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Combining Lemma 9 and 10, we finish the proof of Lemma 8. Finally, combining Lemma 7 and 8,
we finish the proof of Theorem 4.
6 Conclusion
We study the problem of a Borda manipulation with 2 manipulators and 2 non-manipulators (2-
2BM) with one of them weighted by w. We prove that when w ≤ 1, the problem is in P and when
w > 1 and w ∈ Q, the problem is NP-complete. This conclusion could generate the hardness
result of Betzler et al. [2011] when the number of non-manipulators is larger than 2 by splitting an
integer-weight non-manipulator into several unweighted non-manipulators.
But the problem of Borda manipulation when there are more than 2 manipulators still remains
open. This may require the hardness result of d-NMTS problem, which is still a demanding job.
Furthermore we conjecture that the computational hard boundary lies in the total weight relation
between manipulators and non-manipulators. Our work could be a good starting point.
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